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ABSTRACT
The major conclusion of this thesis is that the structure of
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
An international system is necessary in a multi-polar world.
The problem for today is learning how to develop cooperation, not
just assume it. Most striking was the level of cooperation involved in
the area of nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union
signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987
ushered in an unprecedented acceptance of intrusive verification
measures. Even after the demise of the Soviet Empire, cooperation
continued with Russia and those former republics of the Soviet Union
that had intermediate range nuclear forces on their territory. The
puzzle surrounding this historic event is how the two sides managed
to move from conflict to cooperation, from a zero-sum game to
positive gains for both sides. Solving this puzzle may provide lessons
learned from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that can
be applied today to organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq.
Solving this puzzle will also help students of international
relations to better understand how nations learn to cooperate. The
area in which both of the former antagonists had the most visibility,
nuclear arms, became an area of great cooperation. Although an
arms treaty is assumed to be a product of cooperation, the internal
structure of the treaty provides the best mechanism for evaluating
its effect on signatory cooperation. Earlier arms control treaties have
not produced effective implementation organizations. This illustrates
that although cooperation was assumed given a signed treaty,
expected cooperation did not expand or take hold. Even .though a
V
certain level of cooperation leads to an agreement, this level of
cooperation did not sustain itself. The internal structure of the
implementation mechanism of a treaty helps build toward increased
cooperation over time. An analysis of the On-Site Inspection Agency
(OSIA) gives us an understanding of those internal factors, ignored
until now, which directly affect the level of cooperation of those
party to an arms control treaty. The expansion of the OSIA's mission
to include several new treaties indicates that some valuable lessons
already have been learned.
Naturally, an arms control treaty is not a panacea for
developing international cooperation. A treaty may, on the other
hand, persuade a state that is surveying the international scene to
choose cooperation over conflict, but a signed and ratified treaty does
not then guarantee compliance. However, the organization that
implements the treaty specifications does play a larger role in the
overall level of cooperation than previously considered.
The search for a new strategy in the post-Cold War era shows
that reality is more complicated in a multi-polar environment. The
simpler assumptions that explained the antagonistic situation no
longer apply. An attempt must be made to find and develop those
structures which may foster overall cooperation. Those states
debating whether to cooperate in multilateral arms control regimes
should be given an opportunity to cooperate. The area of arms
control is a highly visible symbol of the willingness of a state to work
with other nations, since this area directly relates to national security
issues. As trust and cooperation became more important in a multi-
polar world, the treaty verification structure which accompanies
vi
arms control agreements also becomes more important. By placing
inspections teams in a cooperative environment, beneficial to both
signatory national interest and security goals, a level of cooperation
and trust may be constructed which cannot be obtained by satellites
or open source monitoring. Nations can learn to work together in an
area vital to national security, arms control, by working together.
Nations can learn by doing if the structure of the organization does
not hinder the process. A possible means of cooperation through an
international arms control organization is also discussed.
Rogue states are not considered in this cooperative regime.
Treaties, and the organizations that implement them, do not
guarantee compliance. The structure of organizations designed to
implement arms control treaties, however, may influence those
states sitting on the fence, deliberating cooperation or conflict.
Cooperative arms control organizations may persuade these
undecided nations towards cooperation and away from conflict. The
effect of such factors on cooperation is discussed within the
framework of existing and predicted arms control organizations.
The puzzle posed by the INF Treaty is whether internal factors
of an arms control organization can su.:ve the problem of building
cooperation and if these factors might translate from bilateral to
multilateral organizations. The structure of such an organization is
critical to the organization's ability to fulfill its objectives and achieve
success. Sustained cooperation, therefore, can be a product and




The world is now in the Post-Cold War era. The collapse of the
Soviet Union brought attendant changes in the previously bipolar
world. An international system is necessary in a multi-polar world.
The problem for today is learning how to develop cooperation, not
just assume it. Most striking has been the level of cooperation
involved in the area of nuclear weapons. The United States and the
Soviet Union signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty in 1987 ushered in an unprecedented acceptance of intrusive
verification measures. Even after the demise of the Soviet Empire,
cooperation continued with Russia and those former republics of the
Soviet Union that had intermediate range nuclear forces on their
territory. The puzzle surrounding this historic event is how the two
sides managed to move from conflict to cooperation, from a zero-sum
game to positive gains for both sides. Solving this puzzle may
provide lessons learned from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty that can be applied elsewhere.
Solving this puzzle will also help students of international
relations to better understand how nations learn to cooperate.
Previously, an incremental approach to international cooperation was
the norm. The unprecedented cooperation involved in the
dismantling of the intermediate range nuclear forces indicated that
other avenues were available. The area in which both of the former
antagonists had the most visibility, nuclear arms, became an area of
great cooperation. Although a treaty is assumed to be a product of
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cooperation, the internal structure of the treaty provides the best
mechanism for evaluating its effect on signatory cooperation. Earlier
arms control treaties have not produced effective implementation
organizations. This illustrates that although cooperation was
assumed given a signed treaty, cooperation did not expand or take
hold. Even though a certain level of cooperation leads to an
agreement, this level of cooperation did not sustain itself. The
internal structure of the implementation mechanism of a treaty
facilitates increased cooperation over time. An analysis of a United
States implementation organization, the On-Site Inspection Agency
(OSIA), gives us an understanding of those internal factors, ignored
until now, which directly affect the level of cooperation of those
party to an arms control treaty. The expansion of the OSIA's mission
to include several new treaties indicates that some valuable lessons
already have been learned.
Naturally, an arms control treaty is not a panacea for
developing international cooperation. A treaty may, on the other
hand, persuade a state that is surveying the international scene to
choose cooperation over conflict, but a signed and ratified treaty does
not then guarantee compliance. However, the organization that
implements the treaty specifications does play a larger role in the
overall level of cooperation than previously considered. Arms
control treaties provide a relatively simple, discrete measure of
cooperation. If the arms level decreases, the level of cooperation is
good. Again, cooperation is not guaranteed, nor does a treaty force
rogue states into unwanted and undesired cooperation. However,
states which may be surveying the international environment may
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be persuaded to cooperate under an arms control regime that is
successful rather than choosing a conflictual stance.
The search for a new strategy in the post-Cold War era shows
that reality is more complicated in a multi-polar environment. The
simpler assumptions that explained the antagonistic situation no
longer apply. An attempt must be made to find and develop those
structures which may foster overall cooperation. Those states
debating whether to cooperate in multilateral arms control regimes
should be given an opportunity to cooperate. The area of arms
control is a highly visible symbol of the willingness of a state to work
with other nations, since this area directly relates to national security
issues. As trust and cooperation became more important in a multi-
polar world, the treaty verification structure which accompanies
arms control agreements also becomes more important. By placing
inspections teams in a cooperative environment, beneficial to both
signatory national interest and security goals, a level of cooperation
and trust may be constructed which cannot be obtained by satellites
or open source monitoring. Nations can learn to work together in an
area vital to national security, arms control, by working together.
Nations can learn by doing if the structure of the organization does
not hinder the process. Explaining how cooperation can be fostered
through an international arms control organization is the major
objective of this thesis.
A distinction must be made early in the classification of arms
control organizations. They may be classified as cooperative or
enforcement organizations, depending on the nature by which an
agreement is obtained. An arms control organization may be created
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to enforce certain arms control objectives, for instance the imposition
of disarmament on the loser after a conflict. A cooperative
organization is usually obtained after international negotiations and
domestic approval are arranged. There are prerequisites for both
types. Funding is an example. Both types require a reliable budget
to conduct operations. Some factors, e.g., the level of dispute
resolution mechanisms, are even more important for a cooperative
arms control organization. Rogue states are not considered in this
cooperative regime. Treaties, and the organizations that implement
them, do not guarantee compliance. The structure of organizations
designed to implement arms control treaties, however, may influence
those states sitting on the fence, deliberating cooperation or conflict.
Cooperative arms control organizations may persuade these
undecided nations towards cooperation and away from conflict. The
effect of such factors on cooperation is discussed within the
framework of existing and predicted arms control organizations.
During the Cold War, arms control was an attempt to limit the
threat presented to either side. The idea of international relations as
a zero-sum game fit into the context of the given state of affairs
between the two superpowers. The enormous improvement that
took place between the Soviet Union and the United States was
highly unusual since cooperation did develop. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Two f3rmer antagonists moved from conflict to cooperation. Many
factors assisted the transition. A major factor in the increased level
of cooperation was the agreement, as contained in the INF Treaty, to
eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. By any measure, the
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Treaty has been and continues to be an unqualified success. An
important task is to examine the treaty and the method of
implementation to capture and apply those lessons to discover
whether they can be generalized.
The puzzle posed by the INF Treaty is whether internal factors
of an arms control organization can solve the problem of building
cooperation and if these factors might translate from bilateral to
multilateral organizations. The negotiation phase of the -treaty is
undoubtedly an essential determinant in the future success of the
agreement. However, an equally important consideration is the
structure of the organization that implements the provisions of the
treaty. The optimism that usually attends international treaties on
arms control tends to collapse into pessimism if the treaty is
perceived as ineffectual or irrelevant. This perception is largely
affected by the organization tasked to carry out the treaty. The
structure of such an organization is critical to the organization's
ability to fulfill its objectives and achieve success. Sustained
cooperation, therefore, can be a product and precondition of the
organization through the structure of a given treaty.
The brief historical survey of Chapter Two provides initial data
for determining variables important for explaining and insuring the
success of arms control treaties of today. Looking at treaties with
similar external factors, yet having internal factors different (a 'most
similar cases' research design) gives insights to the questions to ask
arms control organizations of today.
Next, the INF Treaty itself is examined to find out what type of
political framework it provided for the United States organization
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responsible for its implementation and to sketch the magnitude of
the agreement. Third, the On-Site Inspection Agency is examined.
The organizational structure is then addressed as it relates to the
development of cooperation, the aspect that makes this particular
organization interesting. Then, two contemporary organizations are
addressed using the same questions put to the On-Site Inspection
Agency. In conclusion, an attempt is made to predict the structure of
future arms control organizations. Throughout, an effort to relate the
success of an organization to its structure unifies the argument.
Specifically, the major conclusion of the thesis is that the structure of
intrusive verification regimes imbedded within internal treaty
mechanisms provides incentive for international cooperation.
Cooperation is endo:. nous to the structure of the organization and
can help foster increased cooperation. The interesting point is to
discover how antagonists are able to reconstruct their notions of




To fully understand the historic proportions of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States
and Russia, a brief history of previous western arms control treaties
and their associated implementation mechanisms is essential. A
general finding after the review of many arms control treaties is that
before the turn of the twentieth century, the method of verification
for parties to a treaty was trust. This may be explained by the
assumption that the sovereign, as a chosen leader representing God's
will, would not cheat on a deal made with another sovereign ruler.
This situation was non-problematic since most agreements could be
verified, if necessary, prima facie. For example, if a treaty called for
the dismantling of a fort, travelers or emissaries could easily see
whether the fort still stood. As time and technology advanced, the
verification problem increased in complexity. Whereas previous
treaties were primarily bilateral, treaties past the 19th century were
multilateral. These treaties instigated the international social
construction of our current arms control reality.
The following eleven international agreements are presented to
illustrate the struggle to craft implementation regimes. As Lily
Tomlin said, "If we would listen a little better, maybe history
wouldn't have to repeat itself quite so much." The treaties briefly
summarized below indicate that success in arms control was a result,
at least partially, of the internal mechanisms that resulted from the
agreement. Lack of an implementation organization or a poorly
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structured implementation mechanism often resulted in failure. The
historical review provides the variables that will be used to analyze
recent and future arms control organizations; reciprocity, specificity,
funding, independence of the organization, degree of policy-making
responsibility, and extent of dispute resolution mechanisms.
Treaty of Chaumont, 1 March 1814
Two important treaties during the nineteenth century were the
Treaty of Chaumont and the Rush-Bagot Agreement. The Treaty of
Chaumont between England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia was the
foundation for the Quadruple, then Quintuple, Alliance and was the
basis for the Vienna system and the Concert of Europe. Several
ingredients of future arms control treaties are found here. The
Treaty of Chaumont established an objective, quantifiable force level
in Article 1, a funding method in Article II, an enhanced ability to
obtain 'on-site' information in Article IV, and an ability to make
ulterior arrangements without nullifying or abrogating the treaty in
Article XII.1 To improve the level of cooperation, Article VI of the
Supplementary Agreement to the Treaty of Chaumont, signed on 20
November 1815, established "Meetings at fixed periods'"2 to continue
international dialogue. This treaty was a precursor to the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The Treaty of Chaumont
contained a measurable indicator of treaty compliance, fixed troop
levels. It also recognized and established a funding mechanism. By
granting an enhanced diplomatic status to the military commanders
on foreign soil, on-site information was readily available to treaty
1General International Organization. A Source Book, James T. Watkins, IV and
J. William Robinson, [Princeton, NJ, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956], p. 4.
2Ibid., p. 9.
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signatories. A dispute resolution mechanism gave the parties an
ability to make minor adjustments without having to renegotiate the
entire treaty. Lastly, a standing agreement was made part of the
treaty to hold scheduled meetings to improve communication and
cooperation in relation to the treaty. Two years later, across the
Atlantic, another ground breaking treaty was signed.
The Rush-Bagot Agreement 28-29 April 1817
The Rush-Bagot Agreement was a naval disarmament treaty
between the United States and Canada. Each side trusted the other to
disarm, or at least reduce the presence of naval ships, to the required
number. The treaty was verifiable by inspection as each side was
limited to a combined total of 4 armed warships on all the Great
Lakes. Each side kept a minimum naval force, but an actual arms
reduction did occur. This act of international cooperation engendered
further reductions on the Great Lakes.
It seems certain that the Rush-Bagot agreement, coming soon after
a bitter war, had considerable indirect influence on the
betterment of relations and the eventual creation of a disarmed
frontier. 3
Success in arms control, in this case disarmament, led to continued
cooperation in areas beyond arms control between Canada and the
United States. The ability to verify a treaty by inspection is similar
to having an 'on-site' capability. If compliance can be easily
measured, cooperation is increased within the framework of the
treaty. This may then lead to expanded cooperation in other areas as
shown by the generally good level of cooperation that exists today
3A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament, eds., Trevor N.
Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, [New York: R.R Bowker Company, 1973], p. 39.
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between the United States and Canada. The next international
agreement of significance occurred at the end of the nineteenth
century.
The First and Second Hague Conferences
The Final Act of the First Hague Conference, also known as the
Peace Conference, was signed on 22 July 1899 "as an authentic
record but not as a convention to avoid commitment to all the
conventions, declarations, and voeux." 4 This set a precedent for the
idea of international legality and the force of international treaties on
national actors. The three Declarations in the Final Act were arms
control specific in that they prohibited balloon-launched projectiles,
chemical projectiles, and dum-dum bullets. The Final Act of the
Second Hague Conference, signed 18 October 1907, also contained
arms control prohibitions in Annexes VII, VIII, and XIV. In both
Hague Conferences, these prohibitions were in the form of overt
declarations. Neither a verification method nor any type of actual
implementation organization was proposed. Although this attempt at
arms control failed, it was a step in the right direction since it set a
precedent. The conferences also indicated that international norms
affected the decision of states at the turn of the 20th century.
Treaty of Versailles 28 June 1919
Among its other monikers, the Treaty of Versailles may be
called an arms control treaty. This is evident in Articles 42 and 43 of
the Treaty. The Treaty of Versailles explicitly created an active
implementation organization to conduct highly intrusive on-site
4 General international Organization: A Source Bookjames T. Watkins, IV and
J. William Robinson, [Princeton, NJ, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956], p.
25.
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inspections within Germany. The goal of this new organization was
not cooperation, rather it was enforcement. The significant section of
the Treaty is Section IV which explicitly calls for an Inter-Allied
Commission of Control to oversee the disarmament process. Germany
was not trusted to disarm itself. As a result, Article 205 provided
the most comprehensive on-site inspection regime possible.
Ultimately, a poorly designed dispute resolution mechanism derailed
even the best efforts of the Commission.
The article stated that the Inter-Allied Commission of Control
"shall be entitled as often as they think desirable to proceed to any
point whatever in German territory, or to send subcommissions, or to
authorise(sic) one or more of their members to go, to any such
point.'"5 This level of intrusive inspection should have contributed to
a successful implementation of the treaty's specified reductions. The
Inter-Allied Commission of Control had a clear mission according to
the Articles and Clauses of the Treaty. Article 205 established a
verification mechanism to implement the specified arms reduction
contained in earlier Articles and Clauses. This was an important
event. The Treaty of Versailles, in an arms control context, displayed
the combination of making a decision and elaboiating how to execute
the decision.
This combination is a necessary condition for successful arms
control organizations. The events leading up to the decision, and
signature of the treaty, were controlled by several external factors
such as personality, conflicts of ideas, and economics. These external
5A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament, eds., Trevor N.
Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, [New York: R.R Bowker Company, 1973] p. 94.
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factors were the purview of negotiators. What is of vital interest in
the Versailles Treaty is that the final negotiated document merged
the variety of external factors into a single agreement and the
negotiators had the prescience to include a means, the Inter-Allied
Commission of Conarol, to achieving the desired arms control ends of
the Treaty. The anticipated organization as described by the Treaty
of Versailles appeared, at the time, ideal. [See figure 2-1]
Great optimism attended the Versailles Treaty and the popular
hope was for a disarmed Germany as verified by the three
Commissions. Several external factors contributed to the overall
failure of the inspection regime. Even assuming that the Inter-Allied
Commissions of Control could have achieved all the disarmament and
force limitation levels specified in the Versailles Treaty, Germany
covertly avoided most of these restrictions through a "secret
archipelago of installations" 6 in the Soviet Union and other countries
between 1923 and 1933. Within German territory, evasion of the
treaty was de rigeur. General Hans von Seeckt, head of the postwar
Reichswehr, personally resolved to avoid the Commissions of Control
in every way.7  Furthermore, even when presented with evidence of
German violation, the Allies ignored the facts to preserve a spirit of
international cooperation which would promote the formation of the
League of Nations. 8
6
"Archipelago of Deceit: Arms Control and Evasion Between World Wars,"
Robert T. Dumaine, Air War College, Report #325, April 1978, p. ii.
7
"Reichswehr," Colonel Robert D. Brown III, US Army War College, 1 May 1986,
pp. 2-3.8pp. 47-48, "Archipelago of Deceit: Arms Control and Evasion Between World
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Figure 2-2
Winston Churchill warned against the violations of the Treaty of
Versailles by Germany as late as 1935.9 The Inter-Allied
Commissions of Control failed largely because of external factors, but
also due to the structure of the Commissions themselves. The
enforcement mission of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control built
adversarial relatioships, but it was not the deciding factor of its
failure.
9, Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
Policy), SALT II Violations, Senate Hearing, 98th Congress, Second Session,
Committee on Appropriations, Special Hearing, Senate Hearing 98-965, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 9.
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The Versailles Treaty is perhaps the most evident example of
an arms limitation agreement being worse than having none at all.
Given the many factors preventing the Inter-Allied Commissions of
Control (IACC) from achieving their objectives, the fact remains that
the implementation by the three Commissions was not perfect. This
was a direct result of the structure of the IACC as delineated in
Article 205. No coordination of effort was designed into the IACC,
the three Commissions conducted separate and distinct operations
without any sharing of information. Although the duties of the three
Commissions were clear, the duties of the Principal and Allied
Powers were murky. Other than to request immediate compliance if
inspectors detected a violation, no other guidance was available. An
informal, ad hoc superstructure attempted to direct a highly formal,
centralized verification organization. (See Figure 2-2) This created
the most confusion. Obvious cases of noncompliance were lost in the
upper echelons of the Principal Allied Powers as they debated the
consequences of confronting Germany with the evidence forwarded
from the Commissions. No clear line of authority existed to provide
information or decisions regarding disposition of detected violations.
The Soviets recognized this problem and submitted a Draft
Convention for Immediate, Complete, and General Disarmament to
the League of Nations on 15 February 1928.10
This draft was similar to the disarmament provisions of the
Versailles Treaty including the name of the verification organization,
the Permanent International Commission of Control. However, the
10A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament, eds., Trevor N.
Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, [New York, R.R Bowker Company, 1973].pp.
152-154.
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Soviets introduced a Permanent Commission to oversee and
coordinate the specialized Military, Naval, Aeronautical, and Expert
Commissions. To settle disputes regarding disarmament, the draft
convention also envisaged State-level and local Commissions of
Control. Disputes would be handled by the Permanent Commission of
Control which would also be the only arbiter. No dispute resolution
mechanism was available at a level other than ministerial according
to Articles of the Versailles Treaty. The key point is that dispute
resolution mechanisms that allow low and early settlement provide
greater opportunity for continued cooperation than those that
elevate all disputes, no matter how small, to the attention of national
leaders. This creates undo tension and causes strain at the lower
levels where the inspections take place. The dispute resolution
mechanisms must also be integrated into the overall structure. As
the Versailles Treaty shows, an inefficient superstructure creates
more problems for the implementation organization than it solves.
Another fault was that policy making and policy execution
were combined into a single entity, the Inter-Allied Commissions of
Control. The Allies did not have a singular common objective after
the war and this was reflected in the ambivalence toward the IACC.
This failure in policy making led to adverse consequences on the
IACC inspectors, such as being attacked, and Germany not providing
liaisons. 11 Lastly, the cost of the disarmament process was added to
the German war debt. Funding for the IACC was purely made the
responsibility of the German government. Although the Allies had
I l"On-Site Inspection as an Enhancement to Verification," David L. Brafo.d,
Defense Nuclear Agency Report #NPS-56-89-014, August 1989, p. 9.
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an interest in having a minimally armed Germany to continue a
certain balance of European power, the Allies did not want to finance
the disarmament. They would pay in blood for this mistake less than
two decades later. Sadly, the Allies would pursue arms control in
reverse in the 1930s. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18
June 1935 eliminated much of the German naval limitations imposed
by the Versailles Treaty.12
Convention for the Control and Trade in Arms and
Ammunition 10 September 1919
A Central International Office was established under the
Convention for the Control and Trade in Arms and Ammunition on 10
September 1919. Although aimed primarily at restricting trade to
Africa and Asia, it contained provisions used today. The lesson here
is that the League of Nations did not authorize any means for
verification. The control mechanism was the export license. The
Central International Office would collect an annual list of export
licenses granted by each signatory and further, under Article 5, "full
statistical information as to the quantities and destination of all arms
and ammunition exported without a licence(sic)." 13 However, the
Central International Office had no means, under the convention, to
verify the data submitted. The data was assumed to be complete
and accurate. The State was required to license people who could
own warehouses, but again the Central International Office had no
independent verification ability. If one state questioned the
12A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament, eds., Trevor N.
Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, (New York, R.R Bowker Company, 1973] p. 259.
131bid., p. 97.
17
licensing policy of another, no internal mechý,nism for resolution was
available. An interesting feature of this Convention was that Article
16 did provide for a maritime 'challenge inspection' to verify the
nationality of a suspect vessel.
Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in
Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War 17 June
1925
The Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade
in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War restated the 10
September 1919 convention less the Central International Office.
A significant feature is the significant emphasis on, and detailed
provisions for, inspection and publicity as a means of enforcing the
convention. In the interwar period ... there was increased
realization that when national security was at stake, as it was in
arms control and disarmament matters, more substantial means of
enforcement were needed.14
The press essentially replaced the Central International Office in that
arms transfer data were to be published. The published data could
then be easily compared to the Convention limits to determine
compliance. Although a formal implementation organization was not
in the Convention, it did provide a dispute resolution mechanism in
Article 35 which stipulated that any disagreements over
interpretation could be forwarded to the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
Resolution XIV 27 September 1922
141bid, p. 126.
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In addition to worries over the arms trade, the League of
Nations attempted to reduce the overall world armament level since
the general opinion was that the pre-World War I arms race caused
the war. Against the grain of idealistic 'complete and general'
disarmament, Resolution XIV of 27 September 1922 established the
principle that "national security was prerequisite to a reduction of
arms. " 15  Furthermore, it recognized that previous consent to arms
reductions was the first step towards mutual security guarantees.
Mutual security could not be founded upon coercion. Nor could
reduction be simultaneous and universal. The Resolution called for
arms reductions "by means of partial treaties designed to be
extended and open to all countries." 16  Nor would reductions take
place as a result of good intentions and rhetoric. Cooperation was
increasingly becoming problematic in the arms control field.
Resolution XIV also called for the Council of the League to "further
formulate and submit to the Governments for their consideration and
sovereign decision the plan of machinery" 17 for arms reduction. The
League recognized the ability to agree, in principle, to arms reduction
is vastly easier than actually going out and doing it. The 'plan of
machinery' never emerged. A similar fate awaited the Simon
Resolution that the World Disarmament Conference adopted on 23
July 1932. In it, the delegates agreed that "all bombardment from
the air should be abolished-once the machinery for carrying out the
15 General International Organization: A Source Bookjames T. Watkins, IV and





prohibition had been agreed upon ....". 18 This trend of at least
acknowledging the utility of an implementation organization was not
borrowed in naval treaties.
The Washington Naval Treaty 6 February 1922; and the
London Naval Treaty 22 April 1930;
London Naval Treaty 25 March 1936.
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 was a multilateral treaty
that set quite specific limits on size, numbers, and tonnage of
warships but provided no verification mechanism.19 No formal
organization supervised the adherence, or lack thereof, by signatories
to the specified limitations. This situation was repeated in the
London Naval Treaty of 1930; specific limits, no formal means of
verification. At the London Naval Treaty conference six years later
in 1936, in an atmosphere similar to the current Nonproliferation
Treaty Review Conference debate, the 1930 treaty was due to expire
and one country, Japan, had given notice of its impending
withdrawal. Japan was able to exploit the inclusion of escape clauses
in Part IV "under which a nation could ignore the treaty if other
nations did, or if it stated formally that its national defense was
threatened by adhering to the treaty."20  No formal organization was
proposed or employed for verification or information exchange even
though Part III required exchange of information which would be
confidential until the disclosing party published it.
18A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament, eds., Trevor N.




Verification was not a significant consideration in arms control
treaties until Versailles. Trust had been non-problematic for
signatories. Agreements could, if absolutely necessary, be verified
rather easily by tourists or embassy personnel. The sheer volume
and variety of arms available after 1900 vastly increased the
complexity of verification. The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control
were duped and bullied by the Germans, thus dashing any hopes of
true disarmament. Since trust was no longer taken for granted, in
the interwar years the international community began to see the
need for a formal organization that had a responsibility for
implementing those agreements contained in international treaties
and conventions.
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III. DETERMINING THE VARIABLES
External Variables
The reasons for nations to enter into arms control agreements
with others are plentiful. However, upon signature and ratification,
an assumption that a certain level of cooperation exists, whether
coerced or not, is possible. This cooperation is exogenous to the
treaty itself. Clearly, some cooperation did take place to get the sides
to agree to the treaty. This occurs before the treaty is implemented.
The cooperation level spectrum ranges from low in the case of
coercion to high in the case of mutual agreement arrived at to
achieve a common objective. A treaty indicates that some common
level of good will exists at the time of implementation, without
making a judgment as to how 'good' the nations consider each other.
The first criteria for evaluating an arms control organization is the
existence of a signed and ratified treaty to which a state is a party
that binds it to prevailing international norms. At present, a state is
generally expected to adhere to those treaties and conventions that it
signs. In this way, international norms foster the beginnings of
cooperation.
Once a state declares in writing an intention to limit or reduce
its level of arms, the expectation among other signatories is that the
agreement will be honored. Failure to comply results in international
opprobrium and the right of the other parties to seek redress in the
International Court. Disputes over the treaty may always be
resolved in this fashion, whether or not this avenue is explicitly
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presented in the particular treaty. The external variables, then, are
that good will pre-exists implementation, a binding treaty is in force,
and the treaty is a signal for initiating cooperation. These factors
have garnered most of the attention. Once a treaty was in force, the
cooperation problem was not a factor. The focus was on information
and how best to structure verification organizations to provide
reliable and accurate information on compliance. Treaty failure was
blamed on poor information ability, a lack of being able to inspect
anytime, anywhere.
Treaty failure, as the dependent variable of arms control
organizations, needs to be redefined as the inability to sustain and
build cooperation after a treaty has entered into force. Treaty
success, then, is defined as sustained cooperation within a treaty
regime. In arms control treaties, a discrete measure of success is
available using the number of weapons as an indicator. Treaty
success or failure as the dependent variable is affected by factors
both externally and internally to a treaty regime. Until now, external
factors have been the focus. However, internal factors of treaties
also play a significant role which has been overlooked or ignored.
Internal Variables
Factors that teid to ignored when examining arms control
organizations are internal. What is of ultimate interest is the success
of the treaty. States enter into agreements for mutual gain, for
continuing relationships, and for reciprocity. Some benefit accrues to
each side in an agreement. If an outcome is possible acting alone, the
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agreement is superfluous. States may also want to sustain or
formalize existing cooperative arrangements though a formal
document. Reciprocity deals with threats to sovereignty. If the
agreement is a one-way deal, the threat to sovereignty increases.
An aspect of sovereignty is that it includes the absolute
authority of the state to regulate activities within its borders. One of
the requirements of regulation is the execution of treaties. "All
international agreements impose attendant responsibilities for the
state; one of the responsibilities is having an overall regime to verify
the treaty." 2 1 On-site inspection is not a challenge to sovereignty if
the state maintains its responsibility for implementing the treaty
arrangements. A reciprocal organization escorts and facilitates the
inspector organization as a permanent function. A consent to inspect
does not mean a loss of sovereignty any more than an individual's
consent to search implies a loss of freedom. A permanent
organization that reciprocates actions of the inspector organization
helps build cooperation by providing an opportunity for 'tit-for-tat'
cooperation. Cooperation results from small actions at an inspection
site which are then used as a basis for further incremental steps of
increasing levels of trust.
The next question is specificity. How specific is the treaty
when describing the arms to be limited, destroyed, or counted? This
question directly links the treaty to the formal structure of the
organization. Specificity describes the bounding and limiting of the
treaty on the organization. The easy answer, at a glance, is to
2 1
"Trust, But Verify'" Major General Robert W. Parker, Defense 93, Issue #1,
American Forces Information Service, p. 6.
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conclude that a universal limit is the most specific. This is a mistake.
If the treaty calls for destruction of all tanks, for example, then it
would seem trivial to implement. However, in the messy world of
politics, this solution creates more problems than it solves. The crux
of the problem is defining the arms in a manner agreeable and
countable by all signatories. For instance, if a tank is defined as a
mobile platform capable of direct fire out to 3000 meters, then some
artillery pieces could be counted as tanks. Moreover, the arms
control organization and subsequently the treaty are easily
discredited by the mere existence of one proscribed piece of
armament in a universal limit. Thus, if an effective organization
limits or destroys all tanks and one signatory then produces a tank
not destroyed, by denying the consequence it has proven the
organization to be ineffective. On the other hand, an exhaustively
defined universal limit does create an even playing field. As a treaty
becomes more narrowly defined, the chances for achieving
measurable success increases. Although a counter argument to this
is that flexibility is lost, the gain in a clear objective outweighs
possible confusion at the inspection site over imprecise or unclear
definitions.
Another question relates to funding. An organization cannot
survive on good intentions. No set limit of funding is offered, but a
reliable source is necessary. Granted, this is a contentious issue. The
question of who pays how much is entwined in the domestic and
international debate. While access to steady monetary flow does not
add extra capability, the absence of reliable funding diminishes an
organization's capability. The opportunity for cooperation cannot
25
develop if the organization is bonded to domestic purses. The
cooperation process is interrupted if one of the parties has to wait
until money is allocated. The organization needs to be given a goal
and the freedom to maneuver to develop cooperation opportunities.
The following series of questions deals with the structure of the
verification organization itself. First is the extent of independence
given to the organization. Is it subordinate to a larger organization
with the attendant problems of its superior, or is it free to
specifically concentrate on verification? Second is the question of
policy making. Is the responsibility for policy making and
implementatioin combined within the organization, or is this
bifurcated to allow the verification agency to implement treaty
provisions and another separate agency to concentrate and make
decisions regarding policy concerning compliance? The third
question concerns the nature, level, and extent of dispute resolution
mechanisms. Can disputes over treaty interpretation be solved at
the inspector level or must they be raised immediately to the
diplomatic ministerial level? Are there provisions to resolve
disputes at various levels? Do dispute resolution mechanisms exist
within and external to the treaty? What is the flow of disputes? The
fourth question is the type of verification employed; open-source,
national technical means, or on-site? Does verification rely on a
single method? If on-site inspection is used, is this mechanical, e.g.,
video cameras, or personal, using inspectors? The final question asks
whether the organization is differentiated and integrated sufficiently
to achieve the treaty goals. The answers to all the above questions,
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and they are not all-encompassing, help to evaluate an arms control
organization's effectiveness by assessing its structure.
This thesis analyzes the On-Site Inspection Agency first and
uses this organization as the model. It then examines the
International Atomic Energy Agency using the same questions and
compares the results. The specificity, policy making responsibility,
and dispute resolution mechanisms distinguish the successful On-Site
Inspection Agency from the unsuccessful International Atomic
Energy Agency. Two recent arms control organizations are then
compared with the model to predict success or failure. The results
are more easily represented in tabular form:
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IV. THE INF TREATY
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty contains several
lessons that can be generalized for current and future arms control
negotiations. I will focus on the implementation organization that
was created as a result of this particular treaty and use it as a model.
First, a brief history of the treaty itself is useful. A discussion of the
unprecedented on-site verification for nuclear weapons follows and
the final section examines the Articles of the treaty to highlight the
affect of the treaty on the resulting implementation organization.
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, commonly known as
the INF Treaty, set a historic precedent between the two rival
superpowers. For the first time, on-site inspection would be allowed
within the territories of the signatory states. More significantly,
these inspections covered nuclear weapons. The idea of on-site
inspections was not new. The subject of on-site inspections had come
up since the 1950s. 22 In the debate on the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty, Richard Perle said, "I think the principle of on-site
monitoring indeed is a very useful one to establish." 23 Senator
Charles Percy, the Committee Chairman, agreed. The social reality of
2 2 pp. 255-257, Tom Geravasi, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, Harper
and Row Publishers, New York, 1986.
2 3 p. 19, "International Security Policy", Hearing before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First
Session, 27 July 1981, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 1981.
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on-site inspection had been under construction for awhile, but the
INF Treaty was the capstone.
The general international environment shifted its concentration
to the strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 1980s. At a
Canadian arms control conference in February 1982, the consensus
was "that it was essential to commence strategic arms limitation
negotiations" 24 because the dual-track option of the US jeopardized
the fledgling INF negotiations. On 23 November 1983, the first
Pershing II missiles arrived in Europe and the Soviets walked out of
the INF negotiations. 25 NATO and the US abided by the deployment
policy and the Soviets ultimately returned to negotiate INF.
Maynard W. Glitman, Chief Negotiator for INF, said that one of
the major obstacles to concluding the Treaty was "to ensure that we
[the US] really did get effective verification." 26 Three generally




INF provisions were questioned in a Congressional Research Service
Report in early 1988. The report pointed out the concerns over
detection ability by the US since the INF Treaty does not provide an
'anywhere, anytime' approach to inspections. Nor does the INF Treaty
24 p. 15, Arms Limitations and the United Nations, eds. R. B. Byers and Stanley C.
M. Ing, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982.2 5p. CRS-12, Michael N. Zarin, "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty:
Chronology, Major Provisions, and Glossary of Key Terms," CRS Report to
Congress, Report #88-44F, 14 January 1988.2 6p. 13, Understanding the INF Treaty, US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Washington, D.C., 1988.
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include any penalties or sanctions for violations. 27 The accusation was
that the INF Treaty did not meet any of the three goals for
verification. In practice, INF accomplished all three. Later in the
report, the authors indicate that the "fact that the Treaty eliminates an
entire class of weapons.. .and provides intrusive verification measures
are cited by some as factors that make future agreements more
likely." 28  Although INF involved less than 5% of the total nuclear
stockpile, "the real value of an INF Treaty relates to the kind of
superpower relationship it can engender-including chances of
achieving reductions in the more numerous strategic weapons-and less
to its specific mandates." 2 9
In the mid-1980s, Tom Geravasi claimed on-site inspection to
be unnecessary since, using national technical means, "at each site,
we can already see more than any inspector could, and whatever we
cannot see, neither could he."'30 This claim ignores the possibility of
cooperation generated by personal on-site inspections. On-site
inspection is not just a question of information but also of
cooperation, of building social relations. Cooperation is a habit that
builds slack into agreements which then makes accommodations
easier to make by both sides.
The history of the negotiating process is beyond the scope of
this paper, but President Reagan recognized the potential for arms
2 7p. CRS-xi, "Assessing the INF Treaty," CRS Report to Congress, Steven R.
Bowman et. al., Report #88-211F, 16 March 1988.
28p. CRS-xii, "Assessing the INF Treaty," CRS Report to Congress, Steven R.
Bowman et. al., Report #88-211F, 16 March 1988.
2 9p. CRS-66, "Assessing the INF Treaty," CRS Report to Congress, Steven R.
Bowman et. al., Report #88-211F, 16 March 1988.
30 p. 254, Tom Geravasi, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, Harper and
Row Publishers, New York, 1986.
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control as a possible path to increased cooperation during the 1985
Geneva summit when he p'esented a comprehensive plan for arms
cnitrol to General Secretary Gorbachev which "called for verification
measures to promote confidence in compliance" 3 1 with agreements.
Even though the United States recognized the need for an
implementation organization before the treaty was signed, the
genesis of the organization occurred after the INF Treaty was nearly
complete. 3 2
The organization created to fulfill the terms of the INF Treaty
for the United States is the On-Site Inspection Agency. The On-Site
Inspection Agency (OSIA) is a classic case of form following function.
The function of OSIA is plainly spelled out in the basic INF Treaty
document which contains the goals of the new implementation
organization. Before OSIA is studied, the INF Treaty itself must be
highlighted. Measuring effectiveness of the OSIA is a simplified task
as a direct result of the INF Treaty. The dependent variable is the
level of cooperation involved in the implementation of the treaty as
measured by an increase or decrease in the level of arms. If INF
missiles decrease to zero, cooperation is good. Therefore, the Treaty
is a success and so is the implementation organization. More
importantly, the INF Treaty provides a frame, work upon which to
construct an effective arms control organization. The 1 guage of the
INF Treaty specifies what must be done, but not how. This is the
3 1p. 291, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, 1979-1988: New Tests for
U.S. Diplomacy, Volume II, Congressional Research Service, August 1988.
32 p. 14, On-Site Inspections Under The INF Treaty: A History of the On-Site
Inspection Agency and INF Treaty Implementation, 1988-1991, Joseph P.
Harahan, Washington, D.C.: US Goveniment Printing Office, 1993.
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task for the organization itself. A brief look at the treaty indicates a
sturdy skeleton that was then fleshed out by OSIA.
The Preamble designates the parties to the treaty as the United
States and the Soviet Union. It also links the INF Treaty to
obligations of the nuclear states under Article VI of the
Nonproliferation Treaty to make efforts toward nuclear arms
reductions. Article I gives the broad objectives and basic obligations
of each side to eliminate all short-range and intermediate-range
nuclear missiles and each side further promises not to have any such
systems after all have been eliminated. Article II gives precise
definitions of terms used in the treaty. The fifteen terms include
ballistic missile, ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), cruise
missile, ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), intermediate-range
missile, and shorter-range missile. An example of the specific nature
of the definitions is the term 'intermediate-range' missile. The
Article II, paragraph 5 definition reads:
The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM
having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in
excess of 5500 kilometers. 3 3
Article III specifies the exact types of existing missiles, e.g., SS-
20, as defined by Article II. In this way the universal limit of zero
intermediate and shorter-range missiles is directly linked to existing
missiles in each inventory. The exact nomenclature for each missile
is also stated, e.g., SS-20. Article IV explicitly defines, in two phases,
the time frame for elimination of all intermediate-range missiles.
3 3 p. 68, Senate Treaty Documents, Nos. 11-22, United States Congressional Serial
Set, Serial #13857, United States Government Printing Office, Washington,
1990.
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The first phase was to last no longer than 29 months and the second
phase ended not later than three years after entry into force of the
INF Treaty. Article V covers the shorter-range missiles and required
their elimination within 18 months after entry into force. A
requirement to have all shorter-range missiles retained in
elimination facilities within 90 days is also specified in this article.
Article VI prohibits production of new INF missiles and precludes
any flight testing. Paragraph 2 does allow production and testing of
strategic ballistic missiles, given that they do not have stages
interchangeable with intermediate-range missiles proscribed by this
treaty.
Article VII contains the counting rules that are crucial to
verification. Again, precise definitions are given to establish exactly
the different types of missiles to be counted or not counted. An
example of what not to count, in this case anti-ballistic missiles, is
given in paragraph 3:
If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept
and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall
not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this
treaty apply. 3 4
Article VIII places locational and transit restrictions on both
sides to enhance the verification ability during the elimination
period. It specifies where and when the missiles must be a the
beginning of the inspection period and prohibits exceptions to the
3 4 p. 71, Senate Treaty Documents, Nos. 11-22, United States Congressional Serial
Set, Serial #13857, United States Government Printing Office, Washington,
1990.
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Memorandum of Understanding that provides exact coordinates of
where all the missiles are to be located.
Article IX explains when and what kinds of data exchanges and
notifications must occur. This information must be sent through the
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established in 1987. Each side is
required to update data regularly; within 48 hours after every
elimination and at six-month intervals.
Article X establishes the elimination regime, the heart of the
matter. It specifies the elimination of the missiles and specifically
mandates the means of verification as on-site. A Protocol on
Inspection and a Protocol on Elimination, integral documents of the
overall INF Treaty, are referenced here and further expand the
specific nature of the agreement. A ceiling of 100 eliminations by
launching is also emplaced.
Article XI explicitly articulates a 'right' to on-site inspection
under the INF Treaty. Paragraph 2 expands the right of on-site
inspection to the territories of the basing countries giving this
bilateral treaty a multilateral context. Article XI also describes the
various kinds of on-site inspections such as baseline, close-out, and
monitoring.
Article XII recognizes the existence and utility of national
technical means to supplement verification. A surprising aspect of
this article is that each side agrees not to interfere with the other
side's national technical mean of verification using concealment
measures. Moreover, each side agreed to cooperative measures such
as opening roofs of structures upon request to assist verification by
national technical means.
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Article XIII is a watershed section. This section establishes the
Special Verification Commission to help resolve disputes over treaty
interpretation and gives this new commission authority to make
technical changes which do not affect the basic agreement.
Previously, any changes to a treaty had to be renegotiated.
Furthermore, any disputes resulting form treaty interpretations
quickly rose to the ministerial level. The Special Verification
Commission was created as a buffer in between the implementation
organization and the higher policy makers at the state level. This
intermediate dispute resolution mechanism provides a warning to
higher levels that a significant problem is surfacing and allows
adequate time to develop a solution. Nonetheless, a clear line of
authority is established and the dispute is not allowed to stagnate in
the Special Verification Commission. Thus, to fix a minor unforeseen
problem an amendment process is unnecessary. If an amendment is
needed, this mechanism is provided in Article XVI.
Article XIV states that each side will not enter into any treaty
that conflicts with the INF Treaty. Article XV declares the treaty to
be unlimited in duration, thereby forswearing INF missiles forever.
Article XV also gives each party the right to withdraw in
extraordinary circumstances provided a six-month notification is
submitted. Article XVII covers entry into force, registration and
ideDtifies the signing date as 8 December 1987.
All the agreements and protocols are instrumental for
cooperation between the US and Russia, the successor to the Soviet
Union in the particular case of the INF Treaty. Detractors of the Treaty
claim that since INF is primarily a bilateral agreement, few lessons are
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transferable to an international setting. However, the INF Treaty
includes the Basing Country Agreements that permit the on-site
inspection procedures to be conducted on sovereign territory other
than the US and Russia. Missiles and warheads covered by the INF
Treaty that were based in a Warsaw Pact or NATO country were
permitted to be inspected on the sovereign territory where they were
located. The Basing Country Agreements were signed by the Kingdom
of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland with the United States. Diplomatic notes were
exchanged between the United States and the German Democratic
Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding inspections in those two, at that
time, sovereign countries. Technically, the INF Treaty is a bilateral
agreement between Russia and the US. However, an iniernational
cooperative effort regarding on-site inspections on sovereign territory
was necessary before implementation could begin. This brief
examination of the INF Treaty indicates that the purpose of the Treaty
was clear. Having signed and ratified INF, each party knew what was
expected and the hard task of how to accomplish the bold task of
eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons began.
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V. ORGANIZATION THEORY AND OSIA
An examination of the OSIA requires a familiarization with
some organization theory. This chapter explains the organizational
terms, defines how the organization is structured, and describes the
impact of structure on cooperation. Organizations achieve goals that
are beyond the reach of individuals. "But to focus on what
organizations do may conceal from us the more basic and far
reaching effects that occur because organizations are the mechanisms
-the media-by which those goals are pursued."'35 [Italics in original]
Organizations, then, are not merely tools, they are also actors in their
own right. Observing how a particular organization interacts with its
environment may help broaden our understanding of its affect on
other actors and how cooperation can be built.
The internal structure of an organization consists of five
elements. The elements of an organization are its social structure,
goals, technology, and participants. 36 The environment must also be
considered as the fifth element since the organization is
interdependent with the environment.
35 p. 6, W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational. Natural. and Open Systems,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.
3 6p. 13, figure 1-1, W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational. Natural. and Open






All five components are necessary for an organization to exist. The
organization as a whole interacts with and is acted upon by its
environment. It is not an entity unto itself. Moreover, when the
focus is on cooperation, the key element is social structure. Social
structure is the patterned or regularized aspects of relationships
existing among participants in an organization and those
relationships existing between the organization and the environment.
An emphasis is on social structure in this case because the on-site
inspectors interact not just with members within OSIA, but also with
members of another organization on a regular basis. W. Richard Scott
identifies the two interrelated components that comprise the social
structure as normative and behavioral. 3 7
3 7 pp. 14-15, W. Richard Scott, Qreanizations: Rational. Natural. and Open
Systems, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.
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The INF Treaty establishes the values and norms of the OSIA
and, to an extent, helps define roles and behavioral structure. The
goal, selected by the Treaty and implemented by OSIA, is the
elimination of all INF missiles. The norms are explicated in the
Articles and Protocols. For example, part VI of the Inspection
Protocol gives the general rules for conducting inspections. Roles are
defined by referring to the Inspection Protocol and by the
relationship of the individual to others within the organizational
hierarchy. Behavioral activity is also partially delimited according to
the INF Treaty such as the time frames and intervals of the on-site
baseline inspections. The full behavioral structure is discovered by
analyzing the actual conduct of the OSIA during the myriad of on-site
inspections. In so doing, the social structure of the OSIA and its
affect on the larger environmental social system may be obtained.
One vital lesson of the INF Treaty and the OSIA is that "social
structure does not connote social harmony."'38  Despite internationally
approved memorandums, protocols, and agreements, cooperation is
not guaranteed. Conflict results from the structure of relationships
between individuals and groups and is not necessarily an innate
aggressive individual characteristic. While informal structures do
play a role, for OSIA a formal structure will be addressed, "one in
which the social positions and the relationships among them have
been explicitly specified and are defined independently of the
personal characteristics of the participants occupying these
38 p. 15, W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational. Natural. and Open Systems,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.
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positions." 39 This provides an opportunity to address the
relationships of the organization with the environment independent
of personality calculations. These, again, are important, but the focus
here is on the overall interaction of the organization with the
environment.
Second in importance is technology. Technology is that which
is applied for processing an input, e.g., information from an on-site
inspection, into an output, e.g., objective data regarding treaty
compliance. Technology comprises a participant's skills and
knowledge, machines, and mechanical equipment. OSIA
demonstrated that 'low technology' did not equate to low
effectiveness. Specifically, the inspection teams carried tape
measures, flashlights, Polaroid cameras, and other mundane
mechanical equipment for verification. Furthermore, negotiation is a
technology at the inspector level since it is part of the skil and
knowledge the inspectors bring to the organization. This aspect
provides a unique insight into the interrelation of the characteristics
of technology and the structural features of the organization. OSIA's
goals, its conception of desired ends, were provided in the INF Treaty
and embodied in its charter. 4 0
To evaluate arms control organizations according to their
structures, a generic model is needed. The open rational systems
model explains differences among organizations in their formal
structures. The unit of analysis is the organization itself, not
individual participants or subgroups within it. The dependent
3 9 p. 15, W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational. Natural. and Open Systems,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.
40p. 4, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty, Harahan.
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variable is the formal structure, which the model attempts to explain
and measure. 4 1 The quickest, albeit limited, way to grasp the
structure of an organization is through the organization chart.
"Despite obvious shortcomings, the organization chart remains an
important mechanic in formalization. It provides a good shorthand
picture of basic formal relationships."'42  The chart helps depict the
organization against its environment and the relationships among its
subgroups while always bearing in mind that "(b)ecause
organizations are complicated social organisms, they must be viewed
in their total, multi-dimensional context, rather than from a narrow,
mechanical point of view."43
The organization chart will illuminate much, but it does not
always reflect the dichotomy of policy and administration. "Weber
suggested a rough kind of separation of policy and administration, in
which the idea of professional management is emphasized."'44 The
organization may attempt to both make and implement policy. This
situation may be described by saying that policy is the formulation
of goals and administration involves their execution."'45 [Italics in
original] This policy-administration dichotomy is what I call a
bifurcation of responsibility. A tight coupling of policy and
implementation impinges on the organization's freedom of action. If
4 1 p. 130, W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational. Natural. and QOen Systems,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.
42p. 223, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative
O•ganizat•n, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960.
4 3p. 15, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative Organization,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960.
4 4 p. 58, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative Organization,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960.
4 5 p. 82, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative Organization,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960.
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the coupling is too tight, everything becomes politicized since all
implementation actions are concurrently policy actions. Does the
organization implement policy, make policy, or does it try to do both?
The structure of the organization gives answers to these
questions. Structure also affects cooperation if structure is defined
as a stable set of relationships.46 The stable set of relationships is
slowly established over time as organizations interact. Organizations
do become actors in their own right, but interaction with the
environment occurs through human interface. The more an
organization is structured to provide person to person interaction,
particularly with participants of other organizations, the greater the
chance for interaction and the development of stable relationships.
Thus creating more structure which then feeds back into more
interaction and increased structure, or more stable sets of
relationships. This is how structure evolves and stable relations
develop. The challenge in arms control organizations lies in the
internal structure of the organization to prevent a tight coupling
through bifurcation of responsibility.
The lesson of OSIA is,"...as Lilienthal suggests, there are
occasions when the way in which a task is being undertaken may be
of greater significance than the end being pursued."'47 The
simultaneous infusion of inspector teams into the Soviet Union and
into the United States created a large volume of personal interaction
that dealt with a vital national security issue for each side. The
4 6p. 296, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative
Organizaion Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960.
4 7 p. 83, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative Organization,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960.
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elimination of INF missiles continued to be significant, but the
building of cooperation between the former antagonists *through the
on-site inspection teams increased in importance. The way in which
the inspections were conducted resulted in continued cooperation as
indicated by the full elimination of all INF missiles within the treaty
period.
Concurrent with the idea of structure is the idea of an
organization as "a system of relations between people."'4 8 And not
just relations within the organization, but external as well. "The way
to look at organizations is to observe how people behave with one
another on the job .... In short,...study interactions. 49 [Italics in
original] These interactions define the level of cooperation between
organizations which may then translate beyond the bounds of the
organization into the larger environment.
The interactions not only affect structure, they affect how the
social reality is constructed.
The necessity for making daily decisions creates a system of
precedents. Precedents tend to become habitual responses to
situations for which they are defined as relevant and thus to
reinforce the internalization of subunit goals.5 0
This internalization of goals becomes a damper on organizational
dysfunction.51 Another damper is operationality of goals which is
48p. 269, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative
Or,•ization, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960.
49p. 269, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrativ-e
rga•,ization, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960.
50pp. 36-37, James G. March and H. A. Simon, "The Dysfunctions of
Bureaucracy," Organization Theory, ed. D.S. Pugh, Penguin Books, Baltimore,
MD, 1973.
5 1p. 37, James G. March and H. A. Simon, "The Dysfunctions of Bureaucracy,"
Organization Theory, ed. D.S. Pugh, Penguin Books, Baltimore, MD, 1973.
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defined as "the extent to which it is possible to observe and test how
well goals are being achieved."'52 Both of these dampers are at work
in OSIA.
The on-site team leaders for the OSIA have the authority to
make decisions at the inspection site according to the INF Treaty
provisions. As issues are resolved at the site, precedents are
established. The key precedent is the perception that action is
possible and results are immediate. This translates to other teams
and into the entire organization. As a result, subunit goals of mission
accomplishment are reinforced and internalized. An opportunity for
'tit-for-tat' cooperation is available at the point of decision, both at
declared sites and at the monitoring facilities. This builds a reservoir
of shared experiences that reinforce future decisions to continue or
increase cooperation.
Whereas information was considered the central problem of
verification, measures that build confidence in compliance which
then foster further cooperation now play a larger role. On-site
inspection is one such measure, although it is clearly not a panacea.
But within its limitations, on-site inspection can make a contribution
to arms control and to overall cooperation. As Major General Roland
Lajoie, the first Director of the On-Site Inspection agency said:
On-site inspection has limits; we can go to specific sites in search
of specific information and return with more confidence than
before concerning compliance at that particular site .... So it gives us
more confidence, but under restrictive circumstances.
Nonetheless, I think that in itself is very useful. On-site
5 2 p. 37, James G. March and H. A. Simon, "The Dysfunctions of Bureaucracy,"
Organization Theory, ed. D.S. Pugh, Penguin Books, Baltimore, MD, 1973.
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inspection under the INF Treaty has given the U.S. government
incieased confidence. We now have more knowledge about Soviet
forces, and with that knowledge comes perhaps somewhat better
understanding and maybe eventually more predictability in our
relationship. 5 3
53p. 10, "Insights of an On-Site Inspector," Interview of Brigadier General
Roland Lajoie, Arms Control Today, November 1988.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF OSIA
The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) was designed to
accomplish the goals specified in the INF Treaty. "When the treaty
was signed, the United States had no formal mechanism to perform
on-site inspections. However, within six weeks of treaty signature,
Reagan directed the formation of the On-Site Inspection Agency
within the Department of Defense.'"54 The arms level of medium and
short-range missiles decreased to zero in May 1991 in accordance
with the target set by the treaty.55 This is a direct result of the
structure of the organization itself. [See Figure 6-1 ]
5 4 p. 7, "Trust, But Verifyl" Major General Robert W. Parker, Defense 93, Issue
#1, American Forces Information Service.
5 5p. 106 & 112, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty, Joseph P. Harahan,












OSIA was designed to inspect and to reciprocate inspections by the
USSR as evidenced in the organizational structure. The operations
division has an inspectorate division and an escort division.
Reciprocity ensured that the side being inspected had representation
during the inspection and reiterated the notion of the inspected
states sovereign responsibility for treaty implementation. This
48
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division of labor created an integration problem, but it allowed a
greater number of inspections to take place simultaneously. OSIA's
mission of reducing both arsenals to zero assisted the organization in
maintaining a high level of integration. Reciprocity raises an issue
over spying. If an inspector also performs a role of a guide, the
concern is whether this person will 'beat the system' since he or she
understands the intricacies of the inspection rules.
This challenge is met through specific language embedded in
the treaty. As specificity increases, the avenues of evasion decrease.
Although in Article I of the INF Treaty each Party agrees to
"eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not
have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set
forth in this Treaty," 56 the high-sounding language is brought to
earth in the subsequent articles and becomes very technical and
specific. The INF Treaty indicates that both sides understood that
more than an agreement to eliminate these systems was necessary.
An ability to conduct the reductions, a how-to, was equally important
to the decision to do it. The specific language of the treaty helped
the OSIA structure itself to meet the demands of the treaty. By
outlining what to do, the INF Treaty became a firm foundation of
how to get the mission completed.
The third question to be answered is funding. OSIA falls under
the Department of Defense and receives a generous operating budget.
The funding has not been problematic since the Agency fulfills its
5 6 p. 67, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter Range Missiles, Senate Treaty Documents, Numbers 11-22, US
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990.
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purpose. This efficiency reinforces its usefulness and fosters positive
appraisal which then loops back into the evaluation model. OSIA is
seen to accomplish its mission in the allocation segment, OSIA has
clear standards to meet and this makes efficiency tests appropriate,
and all sampling indicators are applicable; outcome-INF missiles = 0,
process-193 elimination teams conducted 600 inspections and
escorts over three years, structural-OSIA highly formalized. 57 The
important point is that OSIA has a steady budget and therefor has an
ability to act when necessary.
OSIA's efficiency affects its survival as well since the efficiency
feeds back into the elaboration of the rationalized myths other
organizations and those in Congress hold. This develops and sustains
OSIA's conformity with the institutional myth regarding its ability
and leads to continuing legitimacy and resources. Thus, OSIA's
survival is assured.
Verification was accomplished under the INF Treaty through
intrusive on-site inspections. On-site inspections were, once again, a
historic departure in the field of nuclear arms control. The physical
presence of inspection teams made it possible to achieve a grass-
roots level of cooperation. National technical means were still part of
the inspection regime, but on-site inspection was the central means
of verification.
Despite being subordinated to the Department of Defense, OSIA
retains a status as an independent agency. The mission of OSIA was
solely the implementation of the INF Treaty although now its mission
5 7 p. 114, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty, Joseph P. Harahan, United
Sates Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1993.
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has expanded to include START I and START II, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Threshold
Test Ban Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and soon the Chemical
Weapons Convention. The mission now is to conduct on-site
inspections according to the associated treaties. Most importantly,
OSIA remains an independent agency.
A significant factor in the success of OSIA is that it was and
continues to be an implementation organization. "On-site inspection
is only one means through which the United States verifies the
declarations and actions of a treaty partner. Agency personnel
monitor, observe, and report."5 8 (Emphasis added] The US policy
community makes compliance judgments. Responsibility for policy
making and implementation is bifurcated. OSIA "operates under the
Department of Defense, but major policy decisions come from an
interagency group that is under the National Security Council. This
arrangement, although appearing somewhat unwieldy, has the
executive side of government determining policy (their central
responsibility), and the operational element of the Defense
Department executing the practical aspects of the Treaty." 59 Policy
making is not at all part of OSIA's mission. [See Figure 6-2]
5 8 p. 8, "Trust, But Verify!" Major General Robert W. Parker, Defense 93, Issue
#1, American Forces Information Service.
5 9 p. 21, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce F. Bach, "Implementing A Conventional
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This bifurcation of responsibility allows the organization to focus on
mission accomplishment. The OSIA is structured to implement the
treaty, not make policy judgments over compliance. The inspection
teams perform a mechanical function to determine compliance.
Questions of policy are transmitted to policy makers in the Executive
Committee.
However, this does not mean that OSIA is incapable of
resolving ambiguities. The extraordinary aspect of OSIA is the extent
of dispute resolution mechanisms available. Robert Bowie identified
the necessity for dispute resolution mechanisms in 1961. He wrote,
In considering procedures for determining violations, two
alternatives can be conceived: the inspectorate could be
required to produce and submit evidence of any violation
to an impartial tribunal which would judge the issue like a
court; or the evidence could be furnished to the parties for
their information and decision as to how to act on it. Some
have taken for granted that the first method is inevitable
or desirable .... If the parties have the privilege of how to
interpret and act on the suspicious data the deterrent to
violation may be enhanced. 60 [Emphasis added.]
OSIA provides both alternatives! Because the former was not a taken
for granted element of the INF Treaty, the latter option was made an
internal characteristic of the on-site inspection process. The inspectors
may raise concerns which become part of the inspection report as
unresolved ambiguities per Article XI, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the
Inspection Protocol. An immediate opportunity to correct evidence of
a suspected violation as soon as one is discovered during the on-site
6 0 p. 51, Robert R. Bowie, "Basic Requirements of Arms Control," Arms Control,
Disarmament, and National Security, ed. Donald G. Brennan, New York: George
Braziller, 1961.
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inspection enhances the deterrent to violation while simultaneously
building cooperation. If an inspector detects a possible violation and
the inspectee recognizes and corrects the violation, greater
cooperation results since both sides are able to agree on exactly what a
violation is.
A case in point is an inspection of ground-launched cruise
missiles (GLCM) conducted at Davis-Montham Air Force Base. Even
though the missiles being inspected were 20 inches shorter than the
standard GLCM pictured in the Memorandum of Understanding, the
Soviets inspection report "did not address these differences as treaty
ambiguities" 6 1 and did not act as though the United States was
attempting to violate the provisions of the treaty. Much of the
groundwork for cooperation like this was prepared before the first
inspection took place. For instance, a possible area of dispute could
have occurred over photography during the inspection. As a result,
if an inspector wants a photograph, the escort team takes
the inspector's camera and shoots two photos, one for the
inspector, one for itself. The sides have agreed that
photographs will only be taken when a question about an
object or building remains unresolved. Other photographs
are not permitted."62
A maximum opportunity exists to resolve disputes at the lowest level,
at the inspection site. Should this fail, the report is forwarded to the
Executive Committee and placed into the policy arena. The INF Treaty
expressly established a Special Verification Commission to handle
61p. 107, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty, Joseph P. Harahan, United
Sates Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1993.
6 2p. 26, Understanding the INF Treaty, US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Washington, D.C., 1988.
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disputes which result from inspections. OSIA has no input or influence
on the Special Verification Commission. This bifurcation of
responsibility of implementation and policy-making, results in a more
effective organization since loose coupling gives added flexibility to
the lowest levels.
An overlooked bonus of the OSIA is the cooperation which
occurs at the lowest level. The teams at the portal sites, on escort, or
on inspection create a spirit of cooperation which then transfers
throughout both the organization and the external political
environment. The taken for granted reality of Russian-American
conflict is reconstrcuted from the bottom up. This shift from conflict
to cooperation was the result of the direct and immediate impact that
the INF Treaty had on national security for both sides. Cooperation
was achieved in an area of vital interest, that of nuclear weapons. But
the acceptance of the INF Treaty did not automatically change the
attitudes of the people who would implement its provisions. By
working together in a professional manner on a project of enormous
import to each side, the teams slowly built up a level of trust. This
trust transceneded interpersonal interactions to the organizational
level. The Russian inspector who noted the differences in the GLCMs
displayed at Davis Montham Air Force base but did not report them as
ambiguities had three years of OSIA history to which he could refer.
At no time was there a suggestion that the American were cheating.
The level of trust and cooperation tends to increase as the expectation
is reinforced with each inspection, escort, and portal monitoring
operation. True, the international coopertion did start off on a good
note. At one of the first elimination sites in 1988, the Soviets
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permitted the American inspectors to take shelter from the rain inside
the cannister of an SS-20. Two years earlier, the intelligence
community would have been satified to get a clear satellite photo of
the cannisters exterior.
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VII. ANALYSIS OF IAEA
In contrast to the OSIA, the International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards system is not successful even though it uses on-
site inspection as a verification strategy. A major difference is the
adversarial nature of the inspections. The host country is inspected
according to a scenario that assumes it is cheating. This does not
foster a sense of cooperation among the member states.
Furthermore, the safeguards agreement is not one between equals
since the nuclear states are distinguished from the non-nuclear
states. An abbreviated history of the International Atomic Energy
Agency helps explain how the agency was established and then an
analysis of the organization is conducted using the internal variables
discussed earlier.
The Agency's goal is to simultaneously promote the peaceful
use of nuclear energy and to implement safeguards on fissile
materials resulting from peaceful nuclear energy production. The
dilemma facing the IAEA is that nuclear material produced as a
byproduct of peaceful nuclear energy production may be used to
produce nuclear weapons. The IAEA recognized its nuclear dilemma
at its founding in 1956: "how was the optimum balance to be struck
between the Agency's developmental role as contributor to peace,
health and prosperity throughout the world, on the one hand, and its
restrictive role as deterrent against atoms-for-war, on the other?" 6 3
6 3p. 136, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear A=e, Arthur N. Holcombe and Inis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
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This directly affected the attitude toward safeguards. If safeguards
were perceived as excessively stringent, no state would use the IAEA
and it would be eclipsed by bilateral and multilateral agreements. If
safeguards were loose, peaceful nuclear material could easily be
diverted for military weapons and the IAEA would be shut down for
failure to control the diversion. The IAEA continues to sit on the
horns of this dilemma today. As Secretary of State Dulles said in
1958, "We must realize that atomic energy materials and know-how
will spread, Agency or no Agency. But the new IAEA must not make
the existing situation worse." 64
The IAEA attempts to maximize the availability of nuclear
energy to the Third World nations while simultaneously attempting
to limit the proliferation of fissile material as required by the
Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. The dependent va, iable, level of
cooperation with the Nonproliferation Treaty as measured by the
number of states with nuclear arms, has increased from 1957 to date
despite the existence of an international treaty and an organization
designed to prevent the proliferation of the material necessary for
atomic bomb production. This increase in nuclear weapons is a direct
result of the IAEA's inability to stem the proliferation of nuclear
material under its purview. The nuclear program in Iraq is just one
example. Iraq became party to the NPT on 29 October 1969 and
entered, in force, into safeguards agreement with the IAEA on 29
February 1972.65 "The legal basis for inspections is agreements
64 p. 146, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Ane, Arthur N. Holcombe and lnis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
6 5 p. 93, International Atomic Energy Agency: 1957-1977 International Atomic
Energy Agency, Vienna, 1977.
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between the IAEA and the state, concluded in the framework of the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for full-scope safeguards on all
nuclear materials." 66 Under the auspices of the Nonproliferation
Treaty, the IAEA pfovided technical assistance to establish a nuclear
power program in Iraq in exchange for an agreement by Iraq to
undergo full-scope safeguards. As predicted in 1958, the IAEA did
make the existing situation in the Middle East worse; Iraq obtained
nuclear material and technical knowledge in a relatively short
period. The nuclear arms level was dangerously close to achieving a
positive number in Iraq before the Gulf War started. The IAEA's
involvement in Iraq will only be analyzed up to the end of the
1980s. Iraq may now be identified as a rogue state. The comparison
of the IAEA against the OSIA is more similar in pre-Gulf War Iraq.
Given that the amount of nuclear fissile material increased in
Iraq despite the safeguards regime, this answers the primary
question, it requires an analysis of the independent variables that
affected this outcome. The acceptance of safeguards also brought
reciprocity, the second question needing to be answered. Although
the fear of safeguards among the IAEA members infringing on
sovereignty dates back to 195667, Iraq was not concerned about the
affects of the IAEA safeguards inspection. Iraq evidently wanted
nuclear technology and a source of fissile material. In return for
6 6 p. 444, Rudolf Avenhaus and Jack T. Markin, "International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards," Modeling and Analysis in Arms Control, eds. Rudolph
Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, and John D. Kettelle, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
1986.
6 7 p. 141, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age, Arthur N. Holcombe and lnis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
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allowing safeguards inspections, Iraq was allowed to provide
inspectors to the IAEA.
Regarding specificity, the third question, the Nonproliferation
Treaty is not specific in its definition of nuclear weapon. In fact, the
NPT allows for peaceful nuclear explosions. This begs the question of
how an explosion is produced without a weapon, except in an
accident like Chernobyl. As a result, inspecting for fissile material,
not weapons, is the goal of the IAEA safeguards. The idea is to
identify the diversion of the critical component of a nuclear weapon,
its fissile material. The IAEA does conduct continuous monitoring
using cameras as well as on-site inspections of safeguarded sites.
The IAEA enjoys a unique status within the United NatiL_-s system, it
is not fully independent, but it is not subsumed under an existing UN
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Figure 7-1
(Page 82, International Atomic Energy Agency 1957-19771
The structure of the IAEA is a mirror of the League of Nations.
"The League of Nations operated through three major organs: (a) a
Council...; (b) an Assembly, consisting of all the member states...; (c) a
permanent Secretariat whose chief officer, the Secretary-General,
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was nominated by the Council and approved by a majority of the
Assembly." 68 The official terminology for its status is autonomous.
In the negotiations on the structure of the IAEA as early as 1954, the
"nature and composition of each of these organs as well as the
relationships among them" 69 were the most troublesome areas. The
goal for the atomic and near-atomic powers was to form an IAEA
that resembled "an atomic parallel to the United Nations Security
Council." 70  "TLe eight Western Atomic powers...in the summer of
1954 unanimously agreed that the Agency should be kept as
removed from the United Nations as possible."71 But the Soviets
proposed "to subordinate the Agency to the Security council" 72 in the
fall of 1954. The result was the that IAEA was neither a subordinate
organ nor an independent entity, but became an autonomous
international organization. This meant that the IAEA would enjoy
benefits associated with special agency status in some matters and
not in others. 7 3
Along with verification responsibility, the IAEA also was a
policy making organization. The IAEA was the first UN organization
with the authority to initiate sanctions which "had no parallel among
6 8 p. 132, A Short History of International Organization, Gerard J. Mangone,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1954.
69p. 128, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age, Arthur N. Holcombe and Inis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
70p. 128, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear A=e, Arthur N. Holcombe and mis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
7 1p. 187, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear A=e, Arthur N. Holcombe and mnis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
72p. 188, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear A6e, Arthur N. Holcombe and Inis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
7 3p. 189, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Ane, Arthur N. Holcombe and lnis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
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the specialized agencies." 74 This authority magnifies the main
problem of the IAEA by forcing the agency to be both an
implementation organization and a policy making body.
This dual responsibility is exacerbated during disputes. The
dispute resolution mechanisms are not deep and are unable to
resolve problems at a low level because "in the IAEA there is a fairly
long and ill-defined communication line marked by a degree of
uncertainty of who decides what and when and that is less well
designed to achieve timely and definitive resolution."7 5  [See Figure
7-2]
74 p. 189, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age, Arthur N. Holcombe and Inis L.
Claude, New York University Press, 1959.
7 5p. 21, INF and IAEA: A Comparative Analysis of Verification Strategy,
Lawrence Scheinman and Myron Kratzer, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
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The IAEA was the first international organization to conduct
on-site inspections at nuclear facilities. Of course these were civilian
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nuclear power plants and only those facilities voluntarily submitted
were put under safeguards. Nuclear weapon states do not have to
place their civilian facilities under the IAEA safeguards program, but
most do so voluntarily. Military facilities are off-limits to the IAEA.
Only peaceful nuclear material is covered and only those placed
under safeguards. 76  Host nation escorts is an interesting feature
under the IAEA. The caveat was that the host nation must request to
escort the IAEA inspection team according to Article XII, Paragraph
A.6 of the IAEA Statute.
If the IAEA is perceived as ineffective, its survival is
threatened. A threat to the IAEA's existence would be "a serious and
largely unambiguous diversion of materials subject to IAEA
safeguards without IAEA detection and under conditions suggesting
that the IAEA was not performing its safeguards job in a competent
manner."'77  This situation happened in Iraq. The goal of safeguards
administered by the IAEA is "to ensure that no non-nuclear weapons
states can secretly divert its civilian nuclear materials and facilities
to military purposes."7 8 Despite the need for safeguards to provide
early warning, in 1970 there was "little reason to be confident that
presently envisioned safeguards will be effective in providing such
7 6p. 444, Rudolf Avenhaus and Jack T. Markin, "International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards," Modeling and Analysis in Arms Control, eds. Rudolph
Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, and John D. Kettelle, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
1986.
77 p. 3-14, "The Prospective Durability of the IAEA Safeguards System and
Financing of the System," International Energy Associates Limited, #IEAL-
R/86-5511I, Fairfax, VA, 24 February 1987.
78p. v, "Nonproliferation Treaty Safeguards and the Spread of Nuclear
Technology," V. Gilinsky and W. Hoehn, RAND Corporation, Report #R-501, May
1970.
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timely warning." 79 In particular, the structure of the IAEA regarding
its technologies revealed major shortcomings in the present non-
proliferation regime. "By depending upon technologies the I.A.E.A.
considered obsolete, the Iraqis were able to make considerable
progress without significantly alarming the international
community." 80 Even if the IAEA had conducted a flawless safeguards
program, as early as 1971 the nuclear community knew .that the
existence of computational and measurement techniques of nuclear
materials had not yet achieved exceptional accuracy and there was a
certain possibility for the growth of an uncontrolled quantity of
nuclear materials within the nuclear power establishment.
Assuming a perfect safeguards plan, then, it was possible to
divert fissile material. Combined with the IAEA looking for newer
technology while the Iraqis employed older methods to develop their
nuclear program, this results in the scenario dreaded as early as the
1950s; that the IAEA could make the nuclear situation worse. By
hoping for the IAEA to prevent the spread of nuclear material, the
signatory states to the NPT were lulled into a false sense of security.
A counter argument is that "(o)verexpectation is a central
problem for IAEA safeguards." 81 This is an attempt to blunt one of
the horns of the agency's dilemma, peaceful use or nonproliferation?
The IAEA cannot prevent diversion in states not party to safeguards.
7 9 p. v, "Nonproliferation Treaty Safeguards and the Spread of Nuclear
Technology," V. Gilinsky and W. Hoehn, RAND Corporation, Report #R-501, May
1970.
80p. vi, "Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned from the Iraqi Case," Todd A.
Dixon, Master's Thesis, NPS, December 1992.
8 1p. 43, The Nonproliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
A Critical Assessment, Lawrence Scheinman, Resources for the Future, Inc.
Washington, D.C., 1985.
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However, the IAEA must be able to detect diversion in those states
with which it has safeguards as in Iraq. If not, the IAEA must be
judged as ineffective and therefore unnecessary. The IAEA views its
role concerning safeguards as one of "verification and confidence
building."8 2 [Italics in original] The role of safeguards "primarily is
one of assurance, verification, deterrence, and detection. It is not
prevention."8 3 But if safeguards do not detect, they should not
continue. Otherwise, they provide a false sense of security. If
safeguards were to "sound the alarm in case of diversion,"8 4 the Iraq
case indicates the alarm may be broken.
Another aspect of the IAEA structure is the way in which a
safeguards inspection is conducted.
Although IAEA safeguards are applied in a collaborative spirit
with the state cooperating in the implementation of inspections,
the development of the safeguards approach is adversarial in its
assumption that violations of safeguards agreements may occur.
This assumption is essential in planning safeguards activities to
assure other states that IAEA safeguards are valid .... For each
facility type, IAEA systems studies have identified potential
scenarios for undeclared removal of material from a facility or
from its assigned location in the facility, undeclared introduction
of material into a facility and undeclared modification of
material .... The safeguards approach is designed to detect
82 p. 44, The Nonnroliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
A Critical Assessment, Lawrence Scheinman, Resources for the Future, Inc.
Washington, D.C., 1985.
8 3 p. 48, The Nonproliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
A Critical Assessment, Lawrence Scheinman, Resources for the Future, Inc.
Washington, D.C., 1985.
8 4 p. 62, The Nonvroliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
A Critical Assessment, Lawrence Scheinman, Resources for the Future, Inc.
Washington, D.C., 1985.
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anomalies in facilities operations that would be created by the
postulated scenarios. 85
This adversarial approach engenders noncooperation but "the
effectiveness of the IAEA's safeguards...depends significantly on the
safeguarded state fulfilling its obligation to cooperate with the
IAEA." 86  The adversarial approach continues despite evidence to the
contrary. The Exxon Nuclear low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication
plant in Richland, Washington was the first US bulk handling facility
to be selected by the IAEA for inspection. Between March 1981 and
November 1983, 12 IAEA inspections were carried out, including
three physical inventory verifications. A cooperative non-
adversarial approach was found to be the best approach for
success. 87  Instead of providing a framework for constructing
cooperation, the adversarial approach prevents it from happening.
An interesting point is that this was the first such inspection within
the United States. This indicative of the sovereignty issue and that
not all states are equal according to the treaty.
A final comment on the IAEA structure is the lack of a
bifurcation of responsibility. Although established as a technical
agency for assistance in peaceful nuclear energy and safeguards, the
dual-hat nature of the IAEA as policy maker and implementer
hinders its operations. "The interdependence of the Agency's
8 5 p. 445-446, Rudolf Avenhaus and Jack T. Markin, "International Atomic
Energy Agency Safeguards," Modeling and Analysis in Arms Control, eds.
Rudolph Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, and John D. Kettelle, Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, 1986.
86p. 16, "Case Study of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," MIIS
IONP Project, David Fischer, 12 June 1993
8 7 Abstract, "Documentation and Analysis of IAEA Safeguards Implementation
at the Exxon Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant," R. A. Schneider, Exxon Nuclear
Company, Report #XN-NF-84-86, Contract #AC1NCI08, October 1984.
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technical subjects within its security and political environment make
it an attractive target for political opportunism." 88 From within the
IAEA and from without, the combination of policy and execution
causes unnecessary friction that adds to the perception of
inefficiency. The IAEA is seen as unable to carry out its own policies.
Tight coupling causes all actions to be politicized thereby reducing
action and making execution more difficult.
The IAEA is fighting for survival. The structural indicator of
efficiency as a process is no longer part of the claim to legitimacy.
Even though "during 1991 the IAEA performed approximately 2,200
on-site inspections at 475 facilities in 58 member states with the
assistance of over 200 IAEA inspectors," 89 lately, efficiency as a
measurable outcome, i.e., a decrease in nuclear fissile material, is
playing a larger role in legitimacy. But the IAEA is slow to react.
Into a resolution by the UN General Assembly, which corresponded to
the annual report required by the IAEA, a paragraph was added to
the standard text commending the IAEA for its "actions in response to
Iraqi noncompliance.. .and its role in implementing Security Council
resolutions 687 and 707 .... ,,90 The IAEA attempts to maintain its
rationalized myth and its isomorphism with that myth in order to
survive. Otherwise, the fact that the IAEA had been in Iraq for over
8 8 p. 35, The Nonproliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
A Critical Assessment, Lawrence Scheinman, Resources for th'; Future, Inc.
Washington, D.C., 1985.
8 9 p. 215, United States Participation in the United Nations, Department of State
Publication 9974, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1992.
9 0 p. 218, United States Participation in the United Nations, Department of State
Publication 9974, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1992.
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two decades, even complimenting Iraq as a model safeguards state,
may fracture the perception of the IAEA as an effective organization
in the safeguards business.
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Vill. ANALYSIS OF UNSCOM
The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq is an example
of an organization which resulted from a modem agreement trying to
solve the problems of enforcing arms control compliance. The initial
indications are that it is successful, that it is working better than the
Inter-Allied Commissions of Control did in post-war Germany.
After Desert Storm, the United Nations created a separate
international arms control organization to destroy chemical and
biological weapons, and the missile systems which could carry them.
Resolution 687 created "a special commission to oversee elimination
of weapons of mass destruction.'"9 1 Resolution 687 also
called for the formation of a Special Commission to find
and destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction-chemical,
biological, and nuclear-and the means to deliver them. It
established coordination with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to deal with Iraq's clandestine
program to acquire nuclear weapons. Most importantly,
the resolution prohibited Iraq from developing such
weapons in the future and laid the groundwork for the
establishment of a mechanism for international monitoring
of Iraq's compliance with this prohibition. 92
The IAEA was tasked to destroy the nuclear material. The goal of
the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) was clear,
9 1p. 6, United States Participation in the United Nations, Department of State
Publication 9974, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1992.
9 2 p. 7, United States Participation in the United Nations, Department of State
Publication 9974, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1992.
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elimination of weapons of mass destruction. From the UN
Resolutions, the structure of UNSCOM initially looked like this:










The UN recognized the need for an implementation organization
which did not do things "the UN way." The organization chart easily
demonstrates the differences between the IAEA and UNSCOM.
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UNSCOM is structured to accomplish one thing, destruction of
weapons. This provides a clear framework for the subordinate
elements. Furthermore, UNSCOM is in practice almost exactly what
the original plan for the IAEA was in theory. Instead of being an
independent nuclear security council, UNSCOM works for and reports
directly to the actual UN Security Council. The Security Council may
establish agencies which assist the functioning of the Council. The
structure evolved further by May 1991 to look like this:
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UNSCOM: Structure D Duties may 1991
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UNSCOM has a direct link to the Security Council and remains a
fairly small organization.. This allows for greater speed when
decisions are made and helps improve the level of integration. It is
easy to communicate within the organization to determine how
inspections are flowing at other sites. The level of differentiation is
appropriate to the mission of the organization as outlined in the
applicable UN resolutions
An interesting development in UNSCOM's structure is the
emergence of a Special Commission which is wholly distinct from the
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Figure 8-3
The Office of the Chairman includes 11 people besides the UNSCOM
Chairman himself. [See Figure 8-4] An intermediate level now exists
between the Office of the Chairman and the Security Council.
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Figure 8-4
Evidently, UNSCOM has learned the value of bifurcation of
responsibility. This may be directly attributable to the assistance
which the OSIA provided to UNSCOM beginning in July 1991. OSIA
"has provided chemical and nuclear weapons experts, linguists, U.S.
surveillance flights and some staff personnel on loan to the U.N.
commission in New York to support whar. appears to be a long-term
effort." 93  The elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
continues, although some snags were encountered. Nonetheless,
UNSCOM discovered seventeen sites related to nuclear weapons
9 3 p. 13, "Trust, But Verify!" Major General Robert W. Parker, Defense 93, Issue
#1, American Forces Information Service.
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research in Iraq after Desert Storm. 94 Declared chemical and
biological sites have also been inspected and weapons have been
eliminated.
This process is important for establishing organizational
effectiveness. The allocation segment for the INF Treaty was
handled by a Presidential directive ordering the establishment of the
OSIA. For Resolution 687, this was accomplished by the UN Security
Council ordering the creation of UNSCOM. However, Resolution 687
provided broader, more extensive inspection authority for nuclear
material. Criteria setting was very well done in the INF Treaty since
the treaty details what must be done before, during, and after on-
site inspections. How the task is accomplished is left to the OSIA.
Criteria setting in the Iraq scenario is both very clear and quite
vague. The task properties for UNSCOM and the IAEA in post-war
Iraq are clear, eliminate all nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and
the associated missiles. Unlike the INF Treaty, the specific
descriptions of these weapons is not included and opens a possible
means for misinterpretation, deliberate and otherwise. The
vagueness creeps in at this point as each side haggles over what
constitutes a particular type of weapon which then falls -under the
category of 'all' types of disputed weapons to be destroyed.
Sampling in the INF Treaty is possible through comparing two key
indicators, the baseline on-site inspection figures and the elimination
inspection reports from each site. For Resolution 687, a similar
9 4 p. vi, "Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned from the Iraqi Case," Todd A.
Dixon, Master's Thesis, NPS, December 1992.
78
approach is possible. The UN looks at the weapons declared on-hand
by Iraq and at the total number destroyed by UNSCOM.
UNSCOM does not allow for reciprocity. The organization is
designed for a specific mission in a single country. Iraq is expected to
cooperate, but no Iraqis are part of the inspectorate. The inspectors
are running into a problem with specificity. Similar to the problems
encountered by the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control under the
Versailles Treaty, the UNSCOM inspectors have difficulty with Iraq's
classification of weapons. Each site seems to require more explicit
and elaborate definition of what a chemical or biological weapons is
and what is considered a component part of that weapon.
The UN nearly fell into to another pitfall of Versailles, funding.
Iraq was responsible for the funding of all efforts of UNSCOM and
allied activities in the aftermath of the war. The Security Council
emphasized that Iraq was fully liable for all costs associated with
carrying out Resolution 687. Until Iraq could pay, member states
were encouraged to contribute. However, the UN soon realized that
some money was better than none and authorized the sale of oil to
offset costs.
UNSCOM is an independent agency, solely responsible for
eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and answers only to
the UN Security Council. As mentioned, UNSCOM does not appear to
be involved in policy making. This task is left to the supervisory
Special Commission and the UN Security Council.
Dispute resolution mechanisms are not available. The
inspectors have the authority to dictate terms to the Iraqi
government representatives at the site. The inspections are on-site
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and do involve host nation escorts. Host nation escorts are needed to
prevent attacks by local Iraqi factions, incited by Saddam Hussein no
doubt, against the UN representatives. In spite of these challenges,
UNSCOM appears to be an efficient organization since the declared
Iraqi weapons are destroyed.
Organizational learning did occur as evidenced by the addition
of an intermediate policy section after implementation phase had
begun. Not much room for dispute resolution is available which
stifles the opportunity for a cooperative framework to be
constructed. Of course, most of the blame for the conflictual nature
of the inspections rests with Iraq. As Tim Trevan, the advisor to the
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM wrote:
Each Time Iraq lies or obstructs operations, the burden of
proof to convince UNSCOM increases; each time Iraq seeks
to circumscribe its rights, UNSCOM's suspicion of Iraq's
intent increases and so does the threshold of proof of good
intent. 9 5
Iraq must break this habit and provide consistent cooperation if it
expects to achieve cooperation in other areas separate from those
related to UNSCOM.
95 p. 15, Tim Trevan, "UNSCOM Faces Entirely New Verification Challenges in
Iraq," Arms Control Today, April 1993.
80
IX. FUTURE ARMS CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS
In the post-Cold War era, arms control can play a role in the
development of international cooperation. Nations are very
concerned with issues dealing with national security. By providing a
forum for interaction in the area of arms control, the possibility
exists for reconstructing the taken-for-granted realities of the past
half century. The very structure of the arms control organization
itself is a significant factor in its success or failure. Deciding what the
structure of the organization will be will shape the cooperation
opportunities available. The organization should not be a cooperative
and an enforcement type agency simultaneously. The IAEA tries to
do both, but it ends up unable to do it all. This chapter focuses on an
arms control organization still under construction and then describes
a model international arms control organization as a guide to policy
makers.
The recent Chemical Weapons Convention gives the
international community cause for hope in the field of arms control.
At first glance, the OPCW exhibits positive and negative features.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
appears to be modeled on the IAEA, yet significant differences are
incorporated. [See Figure 9-1]
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Similar to the IAEA, the OPCW must not hampcr the economic
or technical development of member states in the areas agreed to in
accordance with Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
OPCW attempts to hinder the proliferation of chemical weapons while
avoiding adverse affects on legitimate civilian chemical
manufacturers, e.g., fertilizers. The resembles the IAEA's mandate to
assist the peaceful nuclear programs while hindering nuclear
proliferation. The three-tiered organization also looks like the IAEA;
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General Assembly, Board of Governors, and the Secretariat. If the
OPCW fully models itself after the IAEA, "some IAEA policies...may
hamper the ability to detect or even deter diversion. Analogous
policies for the CWC case could result in minimal intrusiveness, but
could also limit the effectiveness of verification."9 6
Fortunately, organizational learning did occur as the OPCW
bifurcates responsibility in the Secretariat, unlike the IAEA which
does not. The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW is only involved in
implementation and dispensing advice. Policy decisions are the
purview of the Executive Council. The OPCW is still under
development in the Hague and so a deeper analysis of the
organizational structure is not possible yet. The critical test is yet to
be performed, the on-site inspections. However, the organization
does show signs of possible success decreasing the level of chemical
weapons in the world inventory.
A more challenging opportunity is the possibility of a new
international organization that could handle the myriad of on-site
responsibilities which will arise as new agreements, treaties, and
conventions are signed. The OPCW seems to have learned from the
OSIA while still using the IAEA as a base model. However, the
initial mix of resources that are mobilized at the creation
of a particular organizational form are critical in that they
constitute a structural pattern that tends to persist-
imprinting the organization with characteristics that are
preserved across succeeding generations of that form. 9 7
9 6 p. x, Domestic Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Treaty, J. Aroesty, K. A.
Wolf, and E. C. River, RAND Corporation, Report # R-3745-ACQ, October 1989.
97 p. 163, W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural. and Open Systems,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.
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Among the alternatives proposed to remedy the IAEA by an
International Energy Associates Limited study are the establishment
of a new international organization or, a variant to this, modification
of the Statute to separate the IAEA safeguards from other
promotional programs. 98  My recommendation is similar, bifurcation
of responsibility within the existing IAEA or creating an International
On-Site Inspection Agency. A new agency would be a way to dampen
the urge for proliferation. Since nearly all countries are a party to the
NPT, the West(particularly the US) should trumpet the adherence to
Article VI that calls for nuclear states to undertake good faith
negotiations on effective arms control and disarmament measures.
The best example of this is the INF Treaty. Additionally, the "United
States introduced.. .resolution 46/26, 'Compliance with arms
limitations and disarmament agreements.' Adopted by consensus, the
resolution urged all parties to implement and comply with the
entirety of the spirit and provisions of such agreements .... .,99
Compliance and cooperation are possible when conditions for their
construction are provided.
The new international organization cannot rely on technical
means since it
is generally agreed that surveillance by NTM alone will be
inadequate for treaty monitoring of technologically
advanced countries and that verification, to be effective,
9 8 pp. 5-17&5-18, "The Prospective Durability of the IAEA Safeguards System
and Financing of the System," International Energy Associates Limited, #IEAL-
R/86-5511I, DTIC #AD-A201842, Fairfax, VA, 24 February 1987.
9 9 p. 49, United States Participation in the United Nations, Department of State
Publication 9974, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1992.
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will require a combination of NTM, monitoring, and routine
on-site inspection (OSI) of declared facilities.100
A new international organization that conducts on-site inspections
and monitoring functions would help foster international cooperation.
When nations are involved in arms control agreements that
directly relate to national security affairs, the framework for
cooperation is readily available. Given a signed and ratified
agreement, the next most important factor is the structure of the
implementation organization. The organization should improve, not
worsen, the existing situation. This new agency, for ease of reference
it will be called the International On-Site Inspection Agency (IOSIA),
should answer the same questions as previous arms control
organizations. The IOSIA should be a reciprocal organization.
Individual nation-states must maintain the ability to verify those
agreements which it signs. Member states should be able to use the
IOSIA to train participants on the applicable treaties and to conduct
mock inspections. This provides an even playing field and gives all
sides an idea of what to expect during inspections. This sort of
transparency is not difficult to achieve if the associated treaty or
convention is specific regarding weapons undergoing inspection.
Although some flexibility is lost, increasing the specificity reduces
the possibility of misinterpretation and dampens the possibility of a
dispute. Should a dispute arise, an effective, low-level ability to
resolve it must be available. The dispute resolution mechanisms
loop. vii, Domestic Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Treaty, J. Aroesty, K.
A. Wolf, and E. C. River, RAND Corporation, Report # R-3745-ACQ, October 1989.
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must be swift, available at the point of inspection, and provided at
each successive level through the IOSIA.
Ideally, dispute resolution mechanism should also reside in the
policy-making arena. A vital aspect of the IOSIA is that policy and
implementation responsibilities would be bifurcated. IOSIA would
be an implementation organization only. Furthermore, the IOSIA
would be an independent agency. [See Figure 9-2
Proposed International On-Site Inspection Agency and the UN




Inspection would be on-site. This serves two purposes. The first is
the obvious verification mission. On-site inspections provide a good
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indicator of how well the inspected party is complying with an
agreement. The second purpose is to force interpersonal contacts to
establish mutual respect and cooperation. As IOSIA conducts
inspections of various member states, the feedback to all other
signatory states is multiplied by the international character of the
organization. Nations desiring to establish their desirability for
additional or expanded cooperation is other areas, e.g., economic,
could construct a social reality to convince other states that they are
worthy of trust. Host nation escorts play a key role, though not
within the IOSIA itself. Host nation escorts are necessary in that the
host nation retains responsibility, as a sovereign state, to ensure
verification of those treatise which it signs. The IOSIA could not take
that duty away.
IOSIA would be a matrix type of organization, given the
interrelated aspects of modern weapons. The Coordination teams
would share and transmit information from the sub-specialty
divisions across the organization in the Area of missile weaponry.
The active involvement of a state's military would be very
important. In the final analysis, a greater level of cooperation would
result. IOSIA could provide a steppingstone to those states who wish
to increase domestic spending by decreasing military hardware
outlays and simultaneously alleviate the risk of unilateral
disarmament through interaction participation in the IOSIA.
Volunteers would be required to have a high level of participant,
motivation. Motivation would also be buoyed by contributing to
national security of member states. Financing could be pro-rated to
the level of involvement in the IOSIA. A state with large quantities
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of weapons would have to pay a proportionally higher share of
expense compared to one without those weapons, or with fewer
numbers.
On-site inspection is not a panacea for arms control. However,
the interactions that take place during inspections, not possible when
using satellites or other technical devices, may promote the overall
level of cooperation as the level of arms decreases. Nor does this
mean total and complete disarmament. IOSIA would provide a
mutual, interdependent sense of verifiable levels of armament
agreed to under international consent. Since armament. play a vital
role in national security, the attention given to these arms control
endeavors would not wane. Cooperation garnered in this area could
then be expanded to other international areas of interest. In this
way, the world could move from containment of opposing forces to
enlargement of international cooperation in all sectors.
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